

Failing Grades

America's Security Three
Years After 9/11

September 2004

Failing Grades

Three years after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration is failing the test of protecting the American people from the terrorist threat at home and abroad.

That is the sobering conclusion of this report by the Center for American Progress. In the following pages we examine the facts and the Bush administration's record in disrupting terrorist threats and regimes, improving homeland security, curbing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and strengthening our military power. While progress has been made on limited fronts, the record is clear: the American people face greater risks than we did on September 12, 2001.

We have been involved in national security decisions at the highest levels of the U.S. government; we do not underestimate the enormity of the task that the Bush administration has faced. We give credit where credit is due – the initial overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and efforts to upgrade the safety of air travel, for example.

But a comprehensive examination of the record leads us to conclude that far from improving our security, the Bush administration has managed to squander a historic opportunity to bring together the citizens of the United States and the people of the world in a unified fight against terror. While the American people have met the challenge of the last three years, the Bush administration has not.

The Bush administration's doctrine of preemption and reliance on military power alone has emboldened the world's most dangerous regimes and escalated the potential of nuclear conflict. Its policies have alienated governments and peoples around the globe, providing recruiting opportunities for Osama bin Laden and increasing the number and virulence of our enemies in both Muslim and non-Muslim nations. The administration has failed to set priorities or follow up on crucial early successes. And the administration's constant attempts to gain partisan political advantage have divided our people when we most need to be united.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq stand at the center of our analysis. In squandering our nation's prestige and national unity to wage an unnecessary war of choice, the Bush administration has failed in its duty to wisely use our forces and funds to protect the American people. It has

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The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values. We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

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placed the men and women of our armed forces in harm’s way; nearly 1,000 are dead and 7,000 wounded. It has spent \$145 billion to pursue its cause – money that would have been much better spent securing nuclear weapons, defending our ports and railways, and strengthening our military forces. Far from planting the seeds of democracy in the Middle East, this administration has planted new seeds of doubt about America’s credibility and motives throughout the world.

At the end of this report, we present “Assignment for Action,” a list of concrete steps that should be taken to fight a more effective war on terrorism. This list is not a comprehensive strategy. But it provides immediate steps that can better protect the American people today – and make us safer three years from now.

John Podesta
President and Chief Executive Officer
Center for American Progress
September 2004

The Bush Administration's Performance: A Report Card

Terrorist Threat C-

Homeland Security D+

Nonproliferation F

Military Power D

Extracurricular Activities: Iraq

Executive Summary

Three years after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration is failing the test of protecting the American people from the terrorist threat at home and abroad.

Although some progress has been made on limited fronts, the record is clear: the administration's disastrous war of choice in Iraq; its decision to ignore and shortchange real terrorist threats; its half-hearted attempts to secure nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; and its weakening of our military have left the American people facing greater risks than we did on September 12, 2001.

A comprehensive examination of the record of the Bush administration yields a sobering conclusion: far from improving our security, the Bush administration has managed to squander a historic opportunity to bring together the citizens of the United States and the people of the world in a unified fight against terror.

Instead, the administration has emboldened the world's most dangerous regimes and escalated the potential of nuclear conflict. The President's policies have alienated governments and peoples around the globe, and have helped terrorist groups in their recruiting efforts. The administration has failed to set priorities or follow up on crucial early successes.

Any attempt to grade the Bush administration record in the war on terrorism must begin in Iraq – now nothing short of a catastrophic diversion that has weakened our security. The war has claimed nearly 1,000 American lives, left close to 7,000 wounded, and stretched our military to the breaking point. The occupation continues to drain billions of taxpayer dollars every month – and there is no end in sight. The administration's assertion that Iraq is the “central front” in the war on terror has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And the Bush administration's willful manipulation of the facts to lead the country into war has done enormous damage to the presidency and eroded our international credibility.

Terrorist Threat

The Bush administration has earned a “C-” for its efforts to combat terrorist threats abroad and at home since September 11. After suffering a significant military defeat in Afghanistan and the loss of much of its senior leadership, the al Qaeda network adapted. Its decentralized leadership

remains potent and unpredictable, and it now includes a number of loose “affiliates” and cells in countries across the globe, including the United States. The administration’s efforts to stop its funding have been feeble. Osama bin Laden is still at large, and although Afghanistan no longer provides the safe haven it afforded prior to 2001, the Taliban and al Qaeda have regrouped and are staging attacks in the country at the highest rate in three years. Reconstruction is faltering due to insecurity, problems with funding, and the explosion of the illicit drug trade. Now, terrorist attacks around the world, including attacks on U.S. interests, are again on the rise. There is still no strategy for tackling challenges in the weak or failing states that have the potential to be the next terrorist sanctuaries. And the Bush administration’s policies – from the invasion of Iraq to its failure to fund public diplomacy – have fueled anti-American feelings in the Muslim world and severely damaged our credibility among longtime allies.

Homeland Security

The Bush administration’s homeland security policies since September 11 have earned it a “D+” – a grade for good intentions gone far off track. Although the administration has met some success in improving airline security, it lacks both strategies and sufficient funding to improve security for our ports, railways, chemical plants and other infrastructure. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, the administration has failed in its efforts to establish effective border security and terrorist watch lists while setting up new barriers to legitimate visitors and immigrants. Bureaucratic obstacles, personnel shortages and sweeps by the Justice Department have weakened progress on domestic intelligence and counterterrorism. Federal grants are not geared to what states and communities need most – keeping police on our streets and firefighters and emergency personnel and facilities equipped and ready. Money flows too slowly to areas where threats are most significant; the color-coded alert system has become dysfunctional; and federal, state and local authorities say they are handicapped in identifying risks and responding to increased threat levels. The Bush administration was wise to accede to Congressional demand for formation of the Department of Homeland Security but it has fallen woefully short in efforts to integrate and effectively manage the agency. White House insistence on bureaucratic separation of national security and homeland security personnel and budget has only compounded these problems.

Nonproliferation

On any measure, the Bush administration deserves an “F” for its weak and contradictory efforts to control the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials. This is ironic in light of the administration’s recognition that a terrorist armed with such a weapon poses the greatest threat to the American people. But the record is clear. Less weapons-grade nuclear material has been secured in the two years since 9/11 than in the two years prior to the attacks. Administration support for proven threat reduction programs and efforts to track down biological and chemical stockpiles in the former Soviet Union have been marginal, as has backing for global

efforts. Internal divisions and an indecisive President have paralyzed White House efforts to deal with the nations on the so-called “Axis of Evil.” Three years later we have a nuclear-armed North Korea that has rejected international nonproliferation regimes; an aggressive Iran well on the way to developing nuclear fuel cycle capability; and a futile, costly effort to find Saddam Hussein’s non-existent weapons of mass destruction that has eroded our global credibility. Finally, the Bush administration’s commitment to developing new and more “usable” nuclear weapons and to deploying national missile defense has severely damaged our nonproliferation credentials. Coupled with the doctrine of preemption, we have, in effect, encouraged other countries to take up the challenge of a new nuclear arms race, and increased the likelihood of non-state actors gaining access to nuclear materials.

Military Power

Policies that have decreased the Army’s readiness and overuse of the National Guard and Reserve threaten the future of the all-volunteer force have earned the Bush administration a “D” in maintaining our military strength and capabilities. Current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have stretched the military dangerously thin, which has diminished our ability to prevent or respond to another major terrorist attack. Extended and back-to-back deployments have damaged readiness and reenlistment. More than 40 percent of the troops in Iraq serve in the Reserves or National Guard, many units have been called up more than once, and kept on active duty longer than the one year norm. The use of stop-loss for both active and Reserve components and the recall of the Individual Ready Reserve are symptoms of the significant stress and lack of strategy. While U.S. troops operate under increasingly dangerous conditions, soldiers and their families are not being treated properly at home. The Bush administration has supported cuts in combat pay, health insurance, education, and disability care for soldiers deployed abroad and their families at home. Taken together, these steps threaten the future of the all-volunteer force.

Iraq: A Catastrophic Diversion

Any attempt to grade the Bush administration record in the war on terrorism since September 11, 2001 must begin with Iraq. We have no doubt that the Iraqi people are better off as a result of the removal from power of Saddam Hussein. The same cannot be said of Americans. Fifteen months after President Bush proclaimed an end to “major combat operations,” the continuing occupation of Iraq is sapping our resources, diverting us from terrorist threats, and fueling anti-American sentiments in the Muslim world and elsewhere. The administration’s assertion that Iraq is the “central front” in the war on terror has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In fact, we now know that – far from being our crowning achievement in the war on terror – the administration’s war of choice in Iraq has weakened our security. The war has claimed nearly 1,000 American lives, left close to 7,000 wounded, and stretched our military to the breaking point. The occupation continues to drain billions of taxpayer dollars every month, with no end in sight. And the Bush administration’s willful manipulation of the facts leading up to the invasion has done enormous damage to the presidency and chips away at our international credibility every day.

Consider the following:

- Invaluable military resources have been deployed to invade and occupy Iraq, including the bulk of the nation’s Special Forces and intelligence assets, at the expense of vital counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
- The United States to date has spent \$145 billion on the invasion and occupation of Iraq – much of which could have been used to fix critical homeland security vulnerabilities and to reduce the chances that a terrorist group can get its hands on the materials to build a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon.¹
- The oft-cited justifications for going to war in Iraq have been proven false. The independent, bi-partisan 9/11 Commission unequivocally found that Iraq had no ties to the 9/11 attacks. The Commission also concluded that there was no collaborative relationship between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda.² And the administration’s own experts have flatly stated that Saddam did not possess weapons of mass destruction.³

- The war and occupation have strengthened the position and power of neighboring Iran, another member of the administration’s so-called “Axis of Evil.” At the same time, the war has hardened Iran’s resolve to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Almost all the administration’s rosy predictions about post-war Iraq have proved to be wrong and placed our military forces at greater risk. Despite the handover of sovereignty to Iraqis, U.S. forces are being attacked on average 60 times per day, up 20 percent from the three-month period before the handover.⁴
- Iraq has become the new magnet for al Qaeda’s recruiting efforts, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Up to 1,000 Islamic fighters from foreign nations have infiltrated Iraqi territory, where they are co-operating with Iraqi insurgents. Attacks in Iraq by al Qaeda supporters not only contribute to al Qaeda objectives, but the publicity surrounding them encourages others elsewhere to mount attacks.⁵
- The occupation, combined with the horrific abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, has fueled intense hatred and mistrust of the United States among Muslims worldwide. This has radicalized large sectors of the Muslim population and increased al Qaeda’s recruiting power, morale, and operating capacity.⁶ Terrorist networks have been strengthened, not weakened.
- The war in Iraq has left our credibility in tatters among America’s closest allies. The Bush administration’s efforts to get other nations to help shoulder the burden in Iraq have failed – and American taxpayers continue to bear about 90 percent of the military and economic cost of the occupation.

Terrorist Threat: C-

After suffering a significant military defeat in Afghanistan and the loss of much of its senior leadership, the al Qaeda network adapted. Its decentralized leadership remains potent and unpredictable, and it now includes a number of loose “affiliates” and cells in countries across the globe, including the United States. The administration’s efforts to stop its funding have been feeble. Osama bin Laden is still at large, and although Afghanistan no longer provides the safe haven it afforded prior to 2001, the Taliban and al Qaeda have regrouped and are staging attacks in the country at the highest rate in three years. Reconstruction is faltering due to insecurity, problems with funding, and the explosion of the illicit drug trade. Now, terrorist attacks around the world, including attacks on U.S. interests, are again on the rise. There is still no strategy for tackling challenges in the weak or failing states that have the potential to be the next terrorist sanctuaries. And the Bush administration’s policies – from the invasion of Iraq to its failure to fund public diplomacy – have fueled anti-American feelings in the Muslim world and severely damaged our credibility among longtime allies.

Securing Afghanistan

Goal and Assessment

Defeat the Taliban and its terrorist allies.

Gains made by the U.S.-led coalition after the defeat of the Taliban are being rapidly reversed and the Bush administration has failed to respond. Despite the presence of some 18,000 U.S. troops and the 6,500-member NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Taliban and al Qaeda forces are making a comeback, carrying out attacks in the country, and threatening to disrupt upcoming elections.

Findings

Taliban regroups and attacks.

In February 2004, the head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency said that Taliban attacks had “reached their highest levels since the collapse of the Taliban government” in 2001.⁷ Taliban fighters have regrouped in key regions and “remain a real threat,” according to a new United Nations report.⁸

Taliban and al Qaeda leadership still at large.

While the extent of their control is likely limited, senior members of al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership are still at large.⁹ These include Osama bin Laden and former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who are reportedly in hiding along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Al Qaeda is training in the region again.

A video has surfaced which reportedly shows a new al- Qaeda training camp operating in Afghanistan or near the Pakistani border – the first evidence of such capacity since the Taliban fell in 2001.¹⁰

Goal and Assessment

Stabilize and rebuild the country.

Ongoing insecurity remains a crucial problem, and the Taliban and al Qaeda continue to disrupt reconstruction by attacking U.S. forces, Afghans civilians, aid workers and others. Reconstruction

pledges have fallen short of the Afghan government's stated needs.

Findings

Little central government control beyond Kabul.

Warlords control vast territory beyond the capital and continue to traffic in drugs, engage in factional fighting, and provoke instability.¹¹

Inadequate increase in NATO security force.

After much talk of expanding the ISAF, NATO leaders have pledged only 3,500 additional troops to help temporarily increase security for upcoming elections.¹²

Humanitarian aid organizations withdrawing.

Aid workers are leaving out of fear that the country is on the "brink of chaos."¹³ Five NGOs, including the Nobel Peace-Prize winning Doctors Without Borders, suspended operations after a series of attacks in June 2004.¹⁴

Shortfall in reconstruction funds.

The international community's pledges at the Afghanistan donor conference earlier this year amounted to less than half of the \$27.6 billion Afghan President Hamid Karzai estimates his nation will need over the next seven years.¹⁵

U.S. government lacks strategy.

According to the Government Accountability Office, "The U.S. government's strategies for directing its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan evolved during fiscal years 2002-2003, and key operational components of the strategies were incomplete or not drafted until the latter half of fiscal year 2003."¹⁶

Goal and Assessment

Ensure long-term stability and security.

The country's central government remains weak, elections scheduled for October have suffered from delays and security concerns, and demobilization programs for militia members have stalled. Production of opium is close to record levels and continues to fuel a multi-billion dollar illicit economy that funds terrorists.

Findings

Indigenous Afghan government institutions weak.

At this year's NATO Summit, Afghan President Hamid Karzai stated, "Afghanistan does not have at this point the institutions to look after its own security. Ten thousand of the National Army, 20,000 of the national police are not enough for us to secure our lives ..." ¹⁷ President Karzai recently gave a grade of "D" to his government's progress in achieving its goals. ¹⁸

Demobilization of militias stalled.

Roughly 12,000 militiamen have been demobilized, out of an estimated 100,000, leaving a heavily-armed, insecure society. ¹⁹

Illicit drug production rising out of control.

Afghanistan today produces three-quarters of the world's illicit opium and production has increased twenty-fold in the past two years. ²⁰ Opium production is expected to be 50 percent of the country's 2004 GDP – the largest annual crop on record. ²¹

Elections delayed.

Lack of security and logistical obstacles forced postponement of presidential elections scheduled for June 2004 to October. Parliamentary elections have been delayed to April 2005.

Defeating terrorist networks

Goal and Assessment

Dismantle terrorist networks.

The war in Afghanistan and other efforts have eliminated only a small number of thousands of Islamic militants trained by al Qaeda. ²² Al Qaeda has developed into a more dispersed organization that is harder to penetrate. ²³ Sophisticated attacks in Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Spain indicate that al Qaeda has "fully reconstituted, set its sights firmly on the U.S. and its closest Western allies in Europe, and established a new and effective modus operandi that increasingly exploited local affiliates." ²⁴

Findings

Terrorist incidents rising.

Since 9/11, the number of terrorist incidents around the world has increased to the highest level in 20 years.²⁵ There have been more terrorist incidents in the two years after 9/11 than the two years prior to 9/11.²⁶

Al Qaeda leadership remains intact.

One-third of al Qaeda's top leaders remain at large.²⁷ While day-to-day involvement by Osama bin Laden and his deputies is likely limited, a new generation has assumed key leadership positions. Al Qaeda leaders continue to incite followers over the Internet and through pronouncements on television and radio.²⁸ Since the 9/11 attacks, there have been more than a dozen audio or videotapes with messages attributed to bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Al Qaeda active around the world.

There are an estimated 18,000 militants who have been trained by al Qaeda operating in 60 countries.²⁹ Al Qaeda has cooperative relationships with at least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition.³⁰

Terrorist training camps active.

Terrorists linked to al Qaeda have continued to train militants in locations as diverse as the southern Philippines (the staging ground for the 2002 Bali bombings), the Georgia-Chechnya border region, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Somalia.³¹

Al Qaeda cells active in the United States.

According to U.S. law enforcement authorities, al Qaeda " sleeper cells " scattered through the United States, " continue to recruit new members, assist in the acquisition of safe houses and equipment, conduct pre-attack surveillance and relay messages from terrorist leaders and planners. " ³²

Terrorists adapting communications methods.

The Pakistani intelligence service reports that al Qaeda operatives have " learned their lessons well " and have developed more sophisticated communications systems that can evade intercepts.³³ Terrorist groups have significantly expanded their use of the Internet and are now using websites supported by U.S. companies to reach new recruits.³⁴

Goal and Assessment

Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries.

The Bush administration has made little progress in convincing key countries to stop providing safe harbor and assistance to terrorists. As noted by the 9/11 Commission, the United States “must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries” and should “have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run.”³⁵

Findings

Iraq a magnet for terrorist recruiting.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. occupation of Iraq has turned that country into a new focal point for al Qaeda’s recruiting efforts. Up to 1,000 Islamic fighters from foreign nations have infiltrated Iraqi territory, where they are co-operating with Iraqi insurgents. “In counter-terrorism terms, the intervention has arguably focused the energies and resources of al Qaeda and its followers.”³⁶

No strategy for weak and failing states.

Despite the administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy calling weak and failing states a tremendous threat, the White House lacks a strategy for dealing with the 43 countries that lack the capacity to stop terrorist groups from operating within their borders.³⁷ The Bush administration’s new Millennium Challenge Account sets eligibility requirements so high that weak and failing states cannot qualify for assistance and the U.S. still ranks last among the world’s providers of foreign aid (as a percentage of GDP).³⁸

Revived threat in Afghanistan.

The Bush administration has failed to capitalize on its early success in overthrowing the Taliban. The combination of resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda forces, warlord control outside Kabul, spiraling drug production, and a lack of security have greatly increased the chances that a weak Afghanistan continues to be a haven for terrorists.

Iran continues to sponsor terrorist groups.

Iran remains one of the most active state sponsors of international terrorism, supporting Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.³⁹ The Bush

administration has lacked consensus on policy toward Iran, and has in fact strengthened Tehran's hand through the occupation of Iraq and by threatening Iran as a member of the so-called "Axis of Evil."

Insufficient pressure on Pakistan.

Despite record levels of U.S. aid to Pakistan, the Bush administration has failed to turn this leverage into more aggressive steps by the government of Pakistan to track down terrorists. The Pakistan-Afghan border remains one of the world's major sanctuaries for terrorists.⁴⁰

Hesitant, fearful approach to Saudi Arabia.

The administration's policy toward oil-rich Saudi Arabia has been marked by hesitancy, fear and tolerance for the kingdom's half-hearted efforts to crack down on those who practice and preach terror. Self-preservation has motivated the Saudi royal family to begin confronting extremists bent on its overthrow, but it continues to sanction fund-raising by wealthy Saudis and charities that fuel terrorist activities.⁴¹

Goal and Assessment

Disrupt terrorist financing.

Since 9/11, the United States and its international partners have seized \$200 million in terrorist assets, but the seizure rate has dramatically slowed in the past year.⁴² At the same time, terrorists are developing innovative ways to raise, move and use funds, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, extortion, and money laundering.⁴³ The 9/11 Commission found that new efforts to freeze assets have also been harmed by the inclusion of waiting periods before regulations go into effect, leading to inadequate enforcement and easy circumvention.⁴⁴

Findings

Insufficient focus on tracking al Qaeda funding.

The Bush administration has not devoted sufficient resources to uncovering the sources and size of al Qaeda funding. While Al Qaeda is receiving less than the \$30 million a year it got in the years prior to the 9/11 attacks, the so-called "Golden Chain" of wealthy Arab financiers, charities and NGOs continues to

provide a steady flow of funds.⁴⁵ Al Qaeda’s operations are not characterized by high cost (the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the 2004 Madrid bombings cost less than \$10,000 each; the 9/11 attacks were executed with an estimated \$500,000) and it no longer pays the Taliban \$10-\$20 million for safe harbor each year.⁴⁶

More Treasury agents track travel to Cuba than finances of bin Laden and Hussein.

According to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, as of April 2004, there were four agents tracking bin Laden and Hussein’s finances but nearly two dozen agents tracking sanctions involving Cuba.⁴⁷

Clashing bureaucracies fail to produce results.

Analytical capabilities at the CIA and FBI remain weak despite improvements since 9/11. The CIA’s inability to keep up with the ever-changing, complex terrorist financing networks and operational disputes between the FBI and Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration, Customs, and Enforcement have blocked progress.⁴⁸

National Money Laundering Strategy (NMLS) ineffective.

Most government agencies have not created centralized and coordinated investigation units, or developed uniform guidelines for undercover investigations as the NMLS requires. The administration has failed to reconcile the NMLS with other guidelines and strategies, set priorities or establish accountability mechanisms.⁴⁹

Financial institutions possess limited capabilities.

The administration has failed to provide domestic financial institutions with the guidance and tools they need to create financial profiles of terrorist cells and fundraisers. The voluntary approach favored by President Bush has resulted in piecemeal, outdated approaches to sophisticated schemes and hindered efforts to uncover cells and disrupt the flow of funds.⁵⁰

Reversing the Anti-American Tide

Goal and Assessment

Regain the world's respect.

The Bush administration's occupation of Iraq and policies in the global war on terror has fueled rather than reduced anti-Americanism throughout much of the world. The administration has squandered the global goodwill we enjoyed following the 9/11 attacks and severely shortchanged efforts to conduct effective public diplomacy.

Findings

European allies alienated by policies.

The Iraq war, the Bush administration's unilateral rejection of international treaties, and other policies have undermined U.S. credibility among our NATO allies. Majorities of those polled in Germany, France, and Turkey – and half of all Britons and Russians – believe the Iraq war undermined the fight against terrorism. Trust in the U.S. has collapsed in Germany and France. Even in Great Britain, our most staunch European ally, support for the Iraq war in the 12 months prior to March 2004 sank by 20 percent.⁵¹

Muslim opinion of the United States at all-time low.

Majority support in Islamic countries for the U.S. war on terror has evaporated. Favorable views of the United States have declined to one percent in Jordan (25 percent in summer 2002) and 15 percent in Turkey and Indonesia (52 percent and 61 percent favorable in 2002, respectively).⁵²

Disastrous consequences of U.S. treatment of prisoners.

The Bush administration's policies toward prisoners of war and detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan have gravely set back our efforts to win hearts and minds in the Middle East. Torture at the Abu Ghraib prison; the deaths of 40 prisoners at U.S. detention facilities since 2001; policies that condoned torture in Guantanamo Bay; and failure to punish or remove those at the top of the chain of command have compromised our reputation

as a defender of human rights.⁵³ Experts estimate it may take two or three generations to rebuild America's image in the Muslim world.⁵⁴

Public diplomacy still not a priority.

Despite warnings by a high-level advisory group that current levels of public diplomacy funding are “absurdly and dangerously inadequate,” the Bush administration has not taken the necessary action. The public diplomacy budget represents less than 1 percent of the \$145 billion that has been spent on the Iraq war and occupation.⁵⁵ The State Department has added only 34 public diplomacy officers to its ranks since 9/11 (448 total); nearly six in ten public affairs officers say they lack adequate training in public diplomacy; and only 54 State Department employees are sufficiently competent in Arabic.⁵⁶ And the highest ranking administration public diplomacy position remains vacant.

Administration's post-9/11 marketing campaign backfired.

Arab-language networks in several countries refused to broadcast the State Department's 2002 television advertising campaign, which depicted the daily lives of American Muslims. Broadcasters dismissed the ads as simple-minded and condescending.⁵⁷

Development assistance falls short.

The Bush administration has failed to meet its ambitious commitments to expand development assistance through its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program, which aims to increase foreign aid to countries that embrace economic and political reforms. The administration pledged to spend \$10 billion by 2006 but allocated only \$1 billion in 2004 and requested only \$2.6 billion for FY2005.⁵⁸

Educational exchange shrinking.

Educational exchange programs, considered one of the best ways to improve international opinion of the United States, are rapidly declining. International graduate student applications are down 32 percent compared to one year ago and student visa applications are down 24 percent from 2001, with six in ten universities reporting a decline in applications by foreign students.⁵⁹ Scholarships awarded by USAID to students from the Middle East fell to 900 in 2004 from a 1980 high of 20,000.⁶⁰

Homeland Security: D+

Although the administration has met some success in improving airline security, it lacks both realistic strategies and sufficient funding to improve security for our ports, railways, chemical plants and other infrastructure. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, the administration has failed in its efforts to establish effective border security and terrorist watch lists while setting up new barriers to legitimate visitors and immigrants. Bureaucratic obstacles, personnel shortages and sweeps by the Justice Department have weakened progress on domestic intelligence and counterterrorism. Federal grants are not geared to what states and communities need most – keeping police on our streets and firefighters and emergency personnel and facilities equipped and ready. Intelligence and money flows too slowly to areas where threats are most significant; the color-coded alert system has become dysfunctional; and federal, state and local authorities say they are handicapped in identifying risks and responding to increased threat levels. The Bush administration was wise to accede to Congressional demand for formation of the Department of Homeland Security but it has fallen woefully short in efforts to integrate and effectively manage the agency. White House insistence on bureaucratic separation of national security and homeland security personnel and budget has only compounded these problems.

Preventing Attacks

Goal and Assessment

Communicate credible threat information to the public and authorities.

The Bush administration’s color-coded national warning system has failed as the primary mechanism for informing the American public about terrorist threats. Vague, sudden and contradictory announcements – lacking context, new evidence, or guidelines for response – have confused the public, angered state and local authorities, and invited charges of political manipulation.

Findings

Credibility of alert system low.

Neither the public nor government authorities retain trust in the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System. The administration has undermined the system by changing alert status without presenting specific evidence; failing to coordinate among top officials at the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security; and allowing political considerations to leak into the process.⁶¹

State and local authorities receive inaccurate, insufficient threat information.

The administration’s rhetorical emphasis on state and local partnerships has been undercut by its failure to provide sufficient intelligence information to support national alerts. A 2003 survey conducted by the Government Accountability Office found that only 13 percent of federal government respondents reported that sharing terrorist threat information with states and cities was effective; that only one-third of state governments were satisfied; and that only 15 percent of large cities were receiving information they need on the movement of known terrorists.⁶² In addition, 70 percent of state and local agencies say the federal government refuses to share information that they need to appropriately respond to changes in alert level.⁶³

Lack of timely notifications.

DHS is devoting greater attention to it, but there is no formal protocol for notifying local, state and other federal officials when

the terror alert is increased.⁶⁴ Federal, state, and local government agencies commonly learn of threat level changes from media prior to receiving notification from DHS.⁶⁵

Goal and Assessment

Strengthen aviation security.

Progress has been made addressing the weaknesses of the layered security system that was defeated on September 11; passenger and baggage screening at 440 commercial airports has been federalized; all checked baggage is now screened; and cockpit doors on 10,000 domestic and foreign aircraft have been reinforced.⁶⁶ Although we have strengthened ways to foil the attacks like the 9/11 hijackings, we may not be ready for future attempts. Little progress has been made on integrating watch lists, general aviation security, screening cargo on commercial flights, or reducing the threat from shoulder-fired missiles.

Findings

Integrated watch lists not used for airport screening.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not using the government’s integrated terrorist watch list and has been forced to abandon the CAPPS II passenger screening system.⁶⁷ No-fly lists currently used by the airlines are incomplete and lead to an unacceptable level of false identifications, leaving even the Secretary of Homeland Security powerless to prevent people who do not pose a risk from being targeted.

No screening for commercial cargo.

Authorities now screen only about 5 percent of the 2.8 million tons of cargo placed on commercial passenger aircraft despite a mandate in the 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act.⁶⁸ Yet TSA estimates there is potentially a 65 percent chance that terrorists are planning to place explosives in commercial cargo.⁶⁹ Among transportation industry executives surveyed, 80 percent rated the security risks to air cargo as “very high” or “high.”⁷⁰

Turmoil among airport screeners.

Since the federal takeover of airport screeners, there has been an unacceptable level of turmoil and turnover.⁷¹ Screeners receive

only an average of three hours of training per month although three hours per week are required.⁷²

Vulnerability to hidden explosives.

According to the 9/11 Commission, it is still too easy for passengers with hidden explosives to make it through airport security. The latest walkthrough explosive detection technology exists at the Statue of Liberty, but not yet at America's airports.

No progress on general aviation.

Security improvements made at commercial airports have not been matched at the nation's 19,000 general aviation facilities. There is essentially no screening of the pilots and passengers aboard the 200,000 private planes that also fly in our skies.⁷³

No plan to counter shoulder-fired missiles.

The Department of Homeland Security has no comprehensive plan to defend commercial aircraft from the threat of shoulder-fired missiles. Experts estimate that there are about 500,000 of these missiles; they have been used 35 times since 1978 in attempts to shoot down commercial aircraft.⁷⁴

Goal and Assessment

Increase railway security.

More than two million railcars and 500 train stations used by millions of passengers every day remain virtually unprotected.⁷⁵ The Department of Homeland Security lacks a comprehensive strategy to protect commercial and passenger railways; it has studied the vulnerability of the nation's 170,000 miles of rail and done virtually nothing to screen railway passengers.⁷⁶ The administration's reliance on voluntary cooperation by industry to improve safety standards for shipments of hazardous materials by rail has failed to increase security.

Findings

Administration unwilling to force rail industry to safeguard shipments of hazardous materials.

The annual shipment by rail of 83 million tons of hazardous materials like chlorine is nothing short of a time-bomb.⁷⁷ DHS continues to rely on voluntary programs to reroute and safeguard dangerous cargo despite its own finding that large segments of the rail system are vulnerable to sabotage and local officials lack the ability to respond to such an attack.⁷⁸

Rail security is not a DHS priority.

Despite the Madrid attack, the administration provided less than \$200 million in last year’s budget for improving passenger safety on rails. In addition, only 83 of the 200 rail security positions at DHS have been filled.⁷⁹

Goal and Assessment

Safeguard ports and shipping.

The Bush administration has severely underfunded maritime security efforts – in stark contrast to its approach to aviation security – budgeting only a fraction of the billions needed to protect our ports, inspect containers and modernize the Coast Guard. This threatens the welfare of our citizens and our economy, because seaborne shipments account for 95 percent of North American foreign trade.⁸⁰

Findings

Container search programs inadequate.

Only 5 percent of the nearly 8 million seaborne containers entering the United States each year are screened.⁸¹ In addition, while 25 major international ports have agreed to participate in the Container Security Initiative, which pre-screens cargo before it leaves for the United States, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection lacks the resources to test private sector compliance, or expand to ports in developing countries where the risk is highest.⁸² Seventy percent of transportation executives rate the security risks to maritime cargo as “very high” or “high.”⁸³ Yet the Bush administration has done little to create proper incentives for the private sector to move to smarter, more secure containers.

Port security dramatically underfunded.

The Coast Guard estimates that securing U.S. ports will cost \$7.3 billion over 10 years but the Bush administration has distributed only \$441 million in grants.⁸⁴ The administration’s FY2005 budget request includes only \$46 million to implement security measures required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).⁸⁵

MTSA implementation incomplete.

The administration has declared victory on MTSA implementation and compliance with the International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The paperwork may be

in, but ports, facilities, and vessels are a long way from being more secure. The Coast Guard is unable to effectively enforce the MTSA under current conditions.⁸⁶ The rushed timetables and maritime plans were developed before individual security assessments were received. Initial plans were arbitrarily reviewed and lack any sense of priority.

Goal and Assessment

Maintain secure borders and track visitors.

As the 9/11 Commission concluded, the Bush administration has failed in its efforts to establish effective border security while setting up new barriers to legitimate visitors and immigrants. Tracking systems are still weak. A disproportionate share of resources is being spent enforcing cases that represent a low terrorist risk to the United States while lengthy, inflexible and excessive security measures turn away talented, hard-working students, employees and future productive citizens.

Findings

Tracking systems have major gaps.

Initiatives such as the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (USVISIT) and Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) are being gradually implemented, but only cover about 6 percent of the 500 million people who enter and exit the United States each year.⁸⁷ USVISIT is unable to match entry and exit data, a weakness similar to prior tracking systems.

Inspectors lack training, equipment.

Inadequate training of Immigration and Naturalization Service and Customs inspectors and the lack of standard-issue equipment have resulted in inconsistent, sub-standard inspections.⁸⁸ New analytical tools are not yet available to field border inspectors because of the lack of secure information systems and lingering institutional barriers.

No policy on revocation of visas.

DHS has no strategy or system for tracking down and deporting those people who remain beyond the conditions of their stay. Significant weaknesses exist in the implementation of the visa

revocation process, especially relating to coordination and timely transmission of information among federal agencies.⁸⁹

Visa applications falling, backlog remains.

Overall visa applications dropped from 10.4 million in 2001 to 8.3 million in 2002, and American businesses have lost an estimated \$30 billion in the past two years because of visa delays and denials.⁹⁰ At the same time, DHS has failed to achieve its goal of reducing the backlog of six million applications for visa, Green cards and citizenship.⁹¹ The number of pending visa applications has risen by nearly 60 percent over the last three years, to 6.2 million.⁹²

Goal and Assessment

Improve domestic counterterrorism.

Bureaucratic obstacles, personnel shortages and arbitrary arrests and secret detentions that have weakened the credibility of the government and have limited progress on counterterrorism. The FBI deserves some credit for instituting necessary changes, but the Bureau’s organizational culture, lack of experience and absence of long-term priorities mean that real counterterrorism reforms are at least three to five years away.⁹³

Findings

Significant obstacles to intelligence reform.

Establishing the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) alone required merging 14 separate information systems. TTIC puts representatives of intelligence agencies under one roof, but does not create a systematic sharing of information. Intelligence on domestic terrorist threats remains stove-piped due in large part to different security clearance standards within different federal agencies.⁹⁴ The security clearance process is facing a huge backlog due to a lack of common standards and practices between foreign and domestic intelligence agencies and problems at the Office of Personnel Management.⁹⁵ OPM’s e-clearance project promises to speed the process but is still in its infancy.⁹⁶

Homeland Security intelligence

The Information Analysis section of DHS is still in a skeletal stage, lacking the staff, networks and responsibilities for

handicapped.

intelligence collection to perform effectively. DHS hiring has been slowed by security clearances that can take as long as 18 months to complete.⁹⁷

FBI lacks intelligence analysts.

Some 900 analyst positions at the FBI remain unfulfilled, with only 126 new counterterrorism analysts trained in FY2003.⁹⁸ The FBI did not establish priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until 2003.⁹⁹ New analysts are most likely to spend the bulk of their time providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units pursuing cases, rather than systematically analyzing all-source intelligence and gaps in FBI intelligence.¹⁰⁰

FBI analytical capacity poor.

An FBI internal study found that 66 percent of the Bureau’s analytic corps is unqualified to meet key intelligence responsibilities and questioned whether the FBI’s changes – like creating a new Intelligence Management group – are sufficient to address this problem.¹⁰¹ More than 90 percent of the FBI’s special-agents-in-charge have “very little” national security experience.¹⁰² Tactical and strategic analysts are still physically located in each of the FBI’s operational divisions and are only “matrixed” to the Office of Intelligence, creating competing priorities.¹⁰³

Secret arrests and indefinite detention without charge.

The FBI lacks the capacity to translate or review thousands of hours of audio tapes and pages of written material. In the languages most critical for counterterrorism.¹⁰⁴ Despite intense efforts to train personnel, recruit skilled employees and integrate foreign language programs with strategic objectives, the FBI and military are facing big shortfalls in these areas.¹⁰⁵

Secret arrests and indefinite detention without charge.

The Bush administration’s secret roundups of nearly 1,000 Arab and Muslim men and abuse of the material witness statute to jail people without charge after 9/11 have poisoned the Justice Department’s reputation and reduced its chance of getting cooperation from critical communities. Despite opposition from members of Congress and many groups, the administration has carried to the Supreme Court its fight to keep secret the identities of detainees.¹⁰⁶ Heavy-handed tactics make it less likely the government will gain trust and cooperation from key ethnic and religious groups.

Goal and Assessment

Ensure adequate resources for law enforcement.

Bush administration cutbacks have resulted in fewer police on the streets today than there were on September 11, 2001. Police departments across the country – which play a vital role in identifying and tracking down potential terrorists and cells – are experiencing personnel shortages due to budget-driven layoffs, cuts in federal support, increased overtime due to homeland security alerts and overseas deployments of officers who serve in the National Guard and Reserves.¹⁰⁷

Findings

Severe funding cuts hurt law enforcement organizations.

Despite repeated orange alerts, the Bush administration's FY2005 budget calls for a 31.9 percent decrease in law enforcement funding from levels approved by Congress in FY2004.¹⁰⁸ More than seven in ten law enforcement organizations report no increases in external funding.¹⁰⁹

No federal support for elevated alerts.

The administration has no program to help communities defray additional law enforcement costs required under elevated alerts. Raising the alert status from yellow to orange costs the government \$1 billion per week, and according to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, a "Code Orange" costs cities \$70 million per week.¹¹⁰

Improving Preparedness and Response

Goal and Assessment

Make first responders effective.

The existing partnership between the federal government and state and local counterparts is a one-way street – federal mandates without the necessary support and resources to carry them out. The Bush administration has failed to work with first responders to provide the equipment, training and

funds they need to respond to a terrorist nuclear, biological, or radiological attack. DHS has acted too slowly to provide the funds for interoperable communications, which currently makes it impossible for key local officials to create an integrated response command system. Billions of dollars in aid have been provided to states and localities but the DHS grant distribution system is not working. Too little funding is allocated to areas where the terrorist threats are most significant and a report by a special DHS task force has found critical, systemic problems with the funding mechanisms.¹¹¹

Findings

Federal funds not flowing to localities.

States are not meeting the requirement that they allocate federal funds to local officials within 60 days.¹¹² Emergency personnel can no longer apply directly for grants, further slowing the grant process.¹¹³

No way to measure funding levels.

DHS has yet to devise an effective way to determine how much state and local authorities are spending on homeland security – and thus it lacks the ability to plan and budget for the future. Estimates on spending for first responders, for example, range between \$26 and \$76 billion.¹¹⁴

Insufficient funding for state and local emergency personnel.

DHS disbursed \$180 million in Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) in FY2004 to enable state and local governments to hire personnel and focus on an all-hazard approach to emergency management. At this level, however, DHS funding for state and local “first responders” will fall nearly \$100 billion short over the next five years.¹¹⁵

Police unprepared for major attacks.

Police departments in cities across the country do not have the protective gear or training to safely secure a site following an attack involving a nuclear, radiological or biological weapon.¹¹⁶

Fire departments lack personnel and equipment.

Fire departments across the country remain woefully unprepared and ill-equipped: only 10 percent have the personnel and equipment to respond to a building collapse and 40 percent of

firefighters have not received training for responding to a nuclear, biological or radiological attack.¹¹⁷ In 2004, only \$750 million under the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program will be distributed to the more than 20,000 fire departments.¹¹⁸

First responders lack necessary communications equipment.

On average, fire departments across the country have only enough radios to equip one-half of those on a shift and 75 percent of firefighters cannot communicate with other likely first responders at the site.¹¹⁹ The administration has failed to fully support the planned creation of “RapidCom 9/30” – a program to enable first responders in ten urban areas to communicate with each other in the event of an emergency like a terrorist attack.¹²⁰

Cities still unprepared.

Most cities do not have the necessary equipment to determine what kind of hazardous materials emergency responders may be facing.¹²¹ Nearly \$500 million is needed to build the capacity of local EMS departments, including training, protective gear, communications equipment, and planning and coordination.¹²²

Reducing Vulnerability to Terrorism

Goal and Assessment

Strengthen private sector preparedness.

As the 9/11 Commission reported, “the private sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist attack.”¹²³ The Bush administration’s reliance on industry to voluntarily set and meet new standards for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure is at odds with the current urgency of the threat and the risk of serious economic disruption from another attack.¹²⁴ DHS estimates the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation’s 33,000 different critical infrastructure sites, including telecommunications, electrical power, water supply, transportation, banking and finance and emergency services.

Findings

Weak private sector security performance.

On a series of security measures, no more than nine percent of transportation industry executives rated the industry's overall performance as "excellent." Six in ten executives believe that background checks for workers are "very important" to reduce security risks, yet only 14 percent rated the industry's performance in that area as "excellent."¹²⁵ According to a survey conducted by The Conference Board, the median increase in corporate security spending is four percent since September 2001.¹²⁶

The economy is not insured against terrorism.

Despite passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002, most businesses across the country have declined to buy terrorism coverage, leaving the economy dangerously exposed to disruption in the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack. The Bush administration has wrongly assumed that private insurers will resume full terrorism coverage when the temporary government support under TRIA ends on December 31, 2005. But the administration does not plan to engage Congress or the private sector on a solution until July 2005 at the earliest.

No strategy to secure chemical plants.

The United States has roughly 66,000 chemical plants with 4,000 of them identified as "high risk." Despite the dangers of a terrorist attack on these facilities, no federal laws exist that require chemical companies to assess vulnerabilities and reduce the risk of chemical release, whether from attack or catastrophic failure. Voluntary regulations and assessments have not been successful, with many chemical facilities secured by only a padlock and chain.¹²⁷

Civilian nuclear facilities still vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Forty thousand tons of spent nuclear fuel stored at nuclear plants around the country is vulnerable to theft.¹²⁸ Guard training, fire protection, and the security of spent nuclear fuel pools are inadequate. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission lacks a "routine, centralized process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating security inspections to identify problems that may be common to plants" and minimizes security problems through its inspections process.¹²⁹

DHS has no way to measure private sector preparedness.

While DHS rightly recognizes the vital importance of the private sector in homeland security, it has failed to set standards in critical areas. The government has no clue about how much money is being spent on security; estimates vary so widely that they are meaningless.¹³⁰

Goal and Assessment

Maintain medical infrastructure to respond to attacks.

The Bush administration has provided inadequate funding to support existing medical centers that will be needed to respond to bioterror attacks, outbreaks of infectious diseases and other public health emergencies. While the Center for Disease Control (CDC) is helping hospitals prepare for such attacks, most hospitals lack the capacity to handle the influx of patients that would likely follow a major terrorist attack or an attack using a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon.¹³¹

Findings

Medical capacity lacking.

The CDC reports that 81 percent of hospitals participating in basic planning and coordination do not have the equipment necessary to handle patients suffering from a bioterror attack. Only 31 percent of hospitals can handle a large influx of patients. No state reported meeting the benchmark of developing a plan for hospitals to respond to an epidemic involving at least 500 patients.¹³²

Public health infrastructure underfunded, ill-prepared.

Federal assistance to state and local governments to provide equipment and training to respond to terrorist attacks and use of nuclear, radiological or biological weapons is roughly one-third of what is needed.¹³³ Public health laboratories in most states still lack basic equipment and expertise to adequately respond to a chemical or biological attack, and 75 percent of state labs report being overwhelmed by too many testing requests.¹³⁴

Protection from biological attack not a priority.

While the Project BioShield Act, signed in July 2004, marks an important step forward in improving our national preparedness, the initiative was long overdue – almost three years after the 9/11 attacks and eighteen months after the President announced the legislation in his State of the Union address.¹³⁵

Strong Management and Federal Leadership

Goal and Assessment

Establish effective management.

The Bush administration has fallen far short in its efforts to integrate and effectively manage the Department of Homeland Security. Although establishing the Department was a step in the right direction and we recognize that true integration will require decades of work, officials failed to devote the resources necessary to effectively bring together 22 agencies with 170,000 employees. The DHS inspector general said it best at the end of 2003, “To a great degree, the department is still a collection of separate components operating under a common organizational umbrella.”¹³⁶

Findings

DHS reorganization too big, too fast.

After initially opposing its creation, the administration opted for the most difficult possible option in forming the new department, dismissing the idea of a more limited shift focused on prevention of terrorist acts, with the ability to add more missions and organizations later. The reorganization did not make any attempt to address the problems of domestic intelligence at the heart of 9/11 failures, which is only now being addressed.

Separate, not integrated, security strategies and structures.

At the White House level, homeland security and national security are considered separate policy arenas. The redundancy of the National Security Council advisor and strategy with the Homeland Security Council advisor and strategy has made policy coordination more difficult.

Management attention divided by non-security missions.

Mixing terrorism and natural disaster responsibilities creates a false competition between first preventers and first responders, and skews the distribution of homeland security funding. In FY2004 Wyoming received \$61 per person while New York got less than \$25 and California just \$14.¹³⁷

Nonproliferation: F

This grade is ironic in light of the administration's recognition that a terrorist armed with such a weapon poses the greatest threat to the American people. But the record is clear. Less weapons-grade nuclear material has been secured in the two years since 9/11 than in the two years prior to the attacks. Administration support for proven threat reduction programs and efforts to track down biological and chemical stockpiles in the former Soviet Union have been marginal, as has backing for global efforts. Internal divisions and an indecisive President have paralyzed White House efforts to deal with the nations of the so-called "Axis of Evil." Three years later we have a nuclear-armed North Korea that has rejected international nonproliferation regimes; an aggressive Iran well on the way to developing nuclear fuel cycle capability; and a futile, costly effort to find Saddam Hussein's non-existent weapons of mass destruction that has eroded our global credibility. Finally, the Bush administration's commitment to developing new and more "usable" nuclear weapons and to deploying national missile defense has severely damaged our nonproliferation credentials. Coupled with the doctrine of preemption, we have, in effect, encouraged other countries to take up the challenge of a new nuclear arms race, and increased the likelihood of non-state actors gaining access to nuclear materials.

Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Deadly Weapons, Materials, and Technology

Goal and Assessment

Secure global stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear and radiological material.

Despite the President’s claims that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security, the Bush administration has gone backward in efforts to control access to weapons-grade nuclear materials worldwide – securing less in the two years since 9/11 than in the two years before the terrorist attacks. Getting hold of these materials is the last step for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups who have the technical skills necessary for building a nuclear or radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”).¹³⁸

Findings

Less fissile materials secured in the two years before 9/11 than the two years after.

A comprehensive report in 2004 by scientists and nuclear weapons experts at Harvard University concluded that efforts to secure dangerous materials stored at military installations, civilian research reactors and elsewhere have fallen far short.¹³⁹

Delayed and limited G-8 efforts.

The G-8’s admirable Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction – aimed at threaten reduction in the former Soviet Union – is \$3 billion short of its goal.¹⁴⁰ Much of the money pledged has not been appropriated, let alone spent.¹⁴¹ President Bush failed to use the U.S. position as chair in 2003 to advance efforts to extend programs to other nations.

Delayed efforts to secure civilian radiological, nuclear materials.

The Bush administration took more than three years to adopt a systematic initiative to track down and secure fissile materials in poorly guarded civilian facilities and abandoned, or orphaned, sources of radiological materials that could be employed to build a dirty bomb.¹⁴² As with other nonproliferation initiatives announced by the Bush administration, there are few signs that

the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is being actively pursued. It remains to be seen whether GTRI will fulfill its potential.¹⁴³

Goal and Assessment

Secure and dismantle the former Soviet Union's stockpile of nuclear weapons and material.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent crumbling of the infrastructure that keeps Russia's massive nuclear weapons arsenal secure from theft and accidental or unauthorized launch have made the use of weapons or stealing of materials more likely now than during the Cold War. The pace of work on securing and dismantling the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons has remained unchanged since 9/11.

Findings

The Bush administration proposed cutting funding for Nunn-Lugar programs.

Researchers at Harvard University have found that "the administration's requests for cooperative action to control nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise over FY 2002 to 2005 were less, in real terms, than the last Clinton administration request, made long before 9/11 attacks ever occurred."¹⁴⁴

Failure to speed dismantling of excess nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration has allowed technical obstacles, liability issues and bureaucratic disputes to stifle progress in the dismantling of excess nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁵

Tactical nuclear weapons off the table.

The disposition of Russia's estimated 3,000-plus arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons remains outside the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programs.¹⁴⁶ These small and portable but very powerful weapons would make ideal terrorist weapons.

Goal and Assessment

Enhance cooperation with allies to track and interdict illegal weapons shipments.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an important step toward interdicting shipments of deadly technology and delivery systems, but its practical operation will be hampered by the administration's massive credibility problems with our allies, non-

participation of key states, and the practical limitations of searching for needles in a haystack.

Findings

PSI limited by administration's lack of credibility.

Under the PSI, to interdict a ship the United States must secure permission from the flag state of the vessel in question or the state whose coastal waters are being used for navigation, or get U.N. Security Council approval. The loss of credibility over the intelligence leading to the Iraq war means we face a tough uphill battle convincing the council that a particular state or vessel poses a proliferation threat.¹⁴⁷

Administration overstates utility of PSI.

Undersecretary of State John Bolton creates a false sense of security when he says that the PSI will be able to “shut down the ability of persons, companies, or other entities to engage in [the] deadly trade” of weapons and materials of mass destruction.¹⁴⁸ The PSI is entirely voluntary, and key countries such as China and Russia are not participating in it. Tracking football-sized chunks of weapons-usable fissile materials will be much more difficult than finding North Korean missile shipments.

Preventing Countries from Developing or Spreading WMD

Goal and Assessment

Completely and verifiably disarm North Korea.

The Bush administration's inability to form a coherent strategy on North Korea has given Kim Jong-Il the time to develop nuclear weapons and further destabilized the Korean peninsula. North Korea has at least two and as many as eight nuclear weapons – four times the maximum estimate prior to 9/11.¹⁴⁹ Under the Bush administration, Pyongyang has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), aggressively asserted its right to possess a nuclear deterrent, and effectively manipulated the Six Party talks.¹⁵⁰

Findings

Enough plutonium for eight nuclear weapons.

The administration's early refusal to engage with North Korea or work to update the 1994 Agreed Framework gave Pyongyang the extra time it needed to reprocess plutonium and develop weapons. It also signaled a lack of urgency over the threat, one compounded by the administration's ambivalent approach toward the Six Party talks.

"Axis of Evil" label provided justification.

By designating North Korea as part of the "Axis of Evil," Bush hardened Kim Jong-Il's resolve to develop nuclear weapons and gave him a convenient justification for his pursuit.¹⁵¹

Internal divisions paralyzed the administration.

The administration remains deeply divided between those who believe we must engage with North Korea and hardliners who refuse to entertain negotiations and talk openly about regime change. President Bush has personally failed to resolve these differences and allowed North Korea to take advantage of his indecision.¹⁵²

Goal and Assessment

Prevent Iran from developing nuclear fuel cycle capability.

The Bush administration has failed in its efforts to convince Iran to forego developing nuclear weapons. Iran has resumed uranium enrichment activities, and is nearing completion of facilities for making its own fuel for nuclear weapons.¹⁵³ These facilities would enable it to "go nuclear" on a few months notice. The administration's lack of leadership and strategy, lack of leverage, and decision to abdicate responsibility for dealing with Tehran to the Europeans has left us unable to marshal international pressure.

Findings

"Axis of Evil" label emboldened hardliners.

President Bush's decision to adopt the doctrine of preemption, occupy Iraq, and label Iran a member of the "Axis of Evil" strengthened the position of hardliners and gave Tehran a new way to justify development of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁴ Symbolic of this was the recent statement by the Iranian Defense Minister that

his country might launch a preemptive strike against U.S. forces in the Middle East.¹⁵⁵

Administration has no leverage.

The Bush administration’s failure to engage with Iran has left us with no effective diplomatic or economic leverage or options. Ceding responsibility on Iran to European nations, who have been unable to convince Iran to change course, has further weakened our position.¹⁵⁶ The administration’s lack of credibility and influence makes U.S.-led action in the Security Council virtually impossible.

Military action difficult.

By pouring military and intelligence resources into the war and occupation of Iraq, the Bush administration has made less credible its statements that it is “unacceptable” for Iran to go nuclear. Experts say that the United States lacks the intelligence necessary to launch preemptive, targeted strikes against suspected Iranian facilities.

Administration acquiesced in Brazil’s fuel cycle ambitions.

Brazil has no known ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. But the Bush administration’s decision to acquiesce in Brazil’s decision to develop nuclear fuel cycle capability has made it more difficult for the United States to credibly criticize Iran’s activities.

Goal and Assessment

Disarm Iraq.

President Bush justified going to war in Iraq by claiming that Saddam had active weapons of mass destruction programs that posed an imminent threat to the United States. The President’s own inspectors have proved him wrong but we continue to spend millions on the search. Billions of dollars spent on the continuing occupation of Iraq could be much better spent on preventing terrorists and unstable regimes from securing or using weapons of mass destruction.¹⁵⁷

Findings

No weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq.

U.S. intelligence estimates regarding Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs were “all wrong” and no evidence of usable materials or weapons have been found.¹⁵⁸

Iraq distracting from more real WMD threats.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq have helped North Korea and Iran to further develop their nuclear weapons programs. For a fraction of the \$145 billion spent to date in Iraq, the United States could have implemented a program to secure all of the weapons-grade materials in the former Soviet Union and beyond and made great strides in protecting our ports, railways and industrial sites.¹⁵⁹

Tremendous cost of search.

To date the United States has spent more than \$600 million to fund the search for WMD in Iraq – despite former Chief Weapons Inspector David Kay’s concern “that we were still sending teams out to search for things that we were increasingly convinced were not there.”¹⁶⁰ The administration has rejected calls to return responsibility to UN inspectors.

Goal and Assessment

Ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation network is totally shut down.

Despite record-high levels of aid to Pakistan, the Bush administration has failed to exert sufficient pressure on Pakistan to prove it has shut down the black market in nuclear weapons technology operated by A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. Pakistan has refused to let Khan meet with American investigators and has denied requests for a full accounting of the countries that he dealt with or the technology they acquired.¹⁶¹

Goal and Assessment

Verifiably disarm Libya.

Libya’s agreement to verifiably dismantle its weapons of mass destruction is an important achievement. But it is not, Bush administration claims to the contrary, a reaction to the U.S. invasion of Iraq or fear of preemptive strikes. Libya’s agreement is the product of several years of sustained diplomatic negotiation through multiple administrations, in support of the United Kingdom’s efforts, that opened channels of communication; successful counter-proliferation efforts that caught Libya “red handed” importing components

for nuclear and biological weapons; and carefully sequenced positive incentives to disarm.¹⁶²

Reducing the existing nuclear weapons threat

Goal and Assessment

De-legitimize the pursuit and use of nuclear weapons.

The administration's research and development of new, more "usable" nuclear weapons, deployment of National Missile Defense (NMD), rejection of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and failure to secure Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have undermined our leadership on nonproliferation and encouraged other nations to abandon nuclear arms control regimes. The United States spends more today on nuclear weapons than the average level during the Cold War.¹⁶³

Findings

New nuclear weapons legitimize pursuit by others.

The Bush administration's decision to research and develop the so-called "bunker-buster" (designed to destroy underground bunkers) and "mini-nuke" (a low-yield tactical weapon) has severely damaged our nonproliferation credentials. The tactical benefits of these weapons are highly dubious, while the costs to our credibility are enormous.¹⁶⁴ The decision to develop these new weapons has undermined long-standing global taboos against weapons that are not used purely for deterrent purposes, and make it difficult for the United States to tell other countries that developing nuclear weapons are not in their interests.¹⁶⁵

False promise of National Missile Defense (NMD).

The Bush administration's decision to spend \$10 billion to deploy NMD has encouraged nations to develop newer, more sophisticated missile technology. NMD has proven highly unreliable in carefully controlled field tests that are not accompanied by real-life tactics such as decoys and other countermeasures designed to confuse the system.¹⁶⁶

Building new nuclear weapons facilities, rejecting test ban.

The Bush administration has failed to promote the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and is developing new facilities to improve and test weapons. These include: a facility capable of producing several hundred plutonium “pits” (used for triggering nuclear explosions) each year; a factory to produce tritium, an element used to boost the explosive yield of nuclear weapons; a revamped Nevada test site for nuclear testing.¹⁶⁷

Refused to secure Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The Bush administration has refused to seek Senate approval of the CTBT, which would help de-legitimize the development of nuclear weapons. The global test monitoring it requires would enable us to better track nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea.

Failure to pursue verifiable Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

This treaty would end production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. A verifiable FMCT would fortify the credibility of the United States and other nuclear powers to push for stronger nonproliferation rules. In addition, a verifiable treaty would be an important step to better integrate India, Israel and Pakistan - none of which are members of the NPT - into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime

Goal and Assessment

Reduce the number of nuclear weapons pointed at the U.S.

Deployment of National Missile Defense by the Bush administration has encouraged China to increase the number of nuclear weapons it has targeted at the United States, and the White House has missed important opportunities to further reduce the number of nuclear weapons that Russia points at us.¹⁶⁸

Findings

Hundreds of Russian missiles still aimed at the U.S.

The Bush administration’s nuclear posture and development of NMD is dominated by the stale Cold War goals of deterring a massive Russian first strike and having the capability of launching a preemptive decapitation strike against Russia – despite the President’s claim that “the premises of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal.”¹⁶⁹

Big increase in Chinese missiles that target the United States.

Due in large part to America's deployment of National Missile Defense (NMD), China has said it will increase by fourfold over the next ten years the number of nuclear-tipped missiles it has targeted at the United States.¹⁷⁰

Little progress on reducing weapons on alert.

The Bush administration missed a valuable opportunity to take serious steps with Russia after signing the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002. The treaty requires that the United States and Russia lower the number of strategic nuclear weapons on alert to no more than 2,200 from today's approximately 6,000. But the administration insisted on a time-limited, non-verifiable treaty which is binding only until 2012, and does not require that excess weapons be dismantled.

Preventing the Proliferation of Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons

Goal and Assessment

Prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical agents.

Though work on preventing bioterrorism and chemical weapons attacks has accelerated since 9/11, the Bush administration has not aggressively pursued programs to determine the size and scope of the threat, thus limiting efforts to track down agents or prepare for an attack with such weapons.

Findings

Failure to assure the world we have no biological weapons.

Under President Bush, the United States has refused to sign the verification protocol of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that require nations to allow international inspection of laboratories and other facilities. Nor has the White House presented an alternative that would allow for protection of sensitive material while reassuring the world that we have no offensive capabilities.

No substantive progress on stronger global standards for regulating the sale, security of deadly germs.

Global standards are critical because terrorists will look to acquire pathogens wherever it is easiest to do so. Several key producers of deadly pathogens and chemicals still are not participating in global export control efforts, including China, Pakistan, and Russia.

No accounting of deadly germs from South Africa's bioweapons program.

From 1981 to 1993, South Africa operated a bioweapons program called Project Coast. Though South Africa says the germs collected under this program have been destroyed, there is strong evidence that many scientists kept copies of the germs for themselves.¹⁷¹

Goal and Assessment

Fully account for Russia's biological and chemical weapons stockpile.

Without a full accounting of the biological and chemical weapons stockpile in the former Soviet Union, we cannot know whether pieces of it have been stolen by terrorists, or assess how much progress we have made in eliminating the threat. The Bush administration has made little progress in getting Russian President Vladimir Putin to share information about the world's greatest potential source for such agents.

Findings

Incomplete picture of former Soviet biological programs.

Work on converting facilities and reemploying scientists involved in bioweapons programs in the former Soviet Union has greatly accelerated. But we still have not been able to gain access to four key suspected bioweapons facilities, we lack a complete picture of the problem, and we cannot determine whether Russia is abiding by its commitments under the Biological Weapons Convention.¹⁷²

No accounting of chemical weapons stockpile.

Many suspect that Russia's stockpile of chemical weapons and materials may be larger than the 40,000 tons it has declared, which has obstructed funding for dismantling and disposal of the weapons.¹⁷³ But the administration has failed to pressure President Putin to make a full accounting.

Military Power: D

Current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have stretched the military dangerously thin, which has diminished our ability to prevent or respond to another major terrorist attack. Extended and back-to-back deployments have damaged readiness and reenlistment. More than 40 percent of the troops in Iraq serve in the Reserves or National Guard, many units have been called up more than once, and kept on active duty longer than the one year norm. The use of stop-loss for both active and reserve components and the recall of the Individual Ready Reserve are symptoms of the significant stress and lack of strategy. While U.S. troops operate under increasingly dangerous conditions, soldiers and their families are not being treated properly at home. The Bush administration has supported cuts in combat pay, health insurance, education, and disability care for soldiers deployed abroad and their families at home. Taken together, these steps threatened the future of the all-volunteer force.

Army Readiness

Goal and Assessment

Maintain peak war-fighting capabilities.

Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have overstretched the capabilities of the Army and threaten the long-term health of the all-volunteer force. The shortage of active duty troops has led to a series of unsustainable temporary fixes, including stop-loss orders, the overtaxing of the army's National Guard and Reserve, and the call-up of the Individual Ready Reserve. The continuing occupation of Iraq is draining our readiness without making us safer and limits our ability to provide an appropriate military response should we be attacked again.

Findings

Active duty Army too small.

Approximately 322,000 U.S. soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in over 120 countries.¹⁷⁴ The Bush administration is “trying to implement a twelve-division strategy with a ten-division army.”¹⁷⁵ The Department of Defense has conducted a back-door draft, using its stop-loss authority to prevent 11,000 soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan from leaving the Army and calling up thousands of Individual Ready Reservists, who will enter combat zones without recent training.¹⁷⁶

Army units are strained.

The heavy reliance on active duty forces, particularly Special Operations troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has “stretched them very thin” and is diminishing their overall readiness.¹⁷⁷ The Government Accountability Office has warned that the Pentagon’s “current mission approach is significantly stressing U.S. forces.”¹⁷⁸ Without appropriate time to recover from normal combat stress and deployment fatigue, retrain, and rotate new personnel, the units are not as effective.

Special Forces retention down.

Retention of Special Forces soldiers is beginning to suffer as they accept offers from private security contractors who pay

them up to \$1,500 per day for work in war zones, far above the average wage.¹⁷⁹ There is an increasing trend for special operation personnel to opt out of the service when they become eligible for retirement.¹⁸⁰

Delayed funding requests hurt planning.

By delaying supplemental requests for funding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until after the election, the Bush administration has damaged the military’s capacity to plan, maintain operations and deploy appropriate forces. The administration has raised questions about its political motives – and commitment to giving the military what it needs in Iraq – by taking the extraordinary step of placing emergency funding into the regular budget.¹⁸¹

Troops face shortages of critical equipment and ammunition.

Poor planning by civilian leadership meant that hundreds of front-line troops in Iraq went into battle without the most effective body armor, or had to purchase the equipment with their own or their family’s funds. This situation was not fixed until nearly 18 months after the invasion of Iraq.¹⁸² Even today, only one-fifth of the Humvees in Iraq have adequate armor protection.¹⁸³ The military is also facing a shortage of 1.5 billion rounds of small-caliber bullets.¹⁸⁴

Goal and Assessment

Protect America’s National Guard and Reserve.

The United States is relying on the Army National Guard and Reserve like never before. Citizen soldiers make up 40 percent of the U.S. force. Members of the Guard and Reserve are also being used for longer periods, and are subject to back-to-back deployments, which threaten reenlistment rates. The Department of Defense has called the level of use of Reservists and National Guardsmen “unsustainable.”¹⁸⁵

Findings

Strain and declining readiness of Guard and Reserve.

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace has testified that the military is too reliant on the 131,000 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers currently on active duty in the United States and overseas.¹⁸⁶ Fifty-one percent of Army Guard and 31 percent of Air Guard members have been activated since 9/11.¹⁸⁷ About

54,000 reservists and national guardsmen are serving in Iraq; 96,000 have been called to serve or prepare for duty in Iraq or Afghanistan; and 53,000 have been put on alert.¹⁸⁸

Reenlistment and recruitment rates dropping.

The National Guard is on pace to end up 12 percent short of its annual recruiting goal.¹⁸⁹ For the 18-month period ending March 31, 2004, reenlistment in the Army Reserve was running 7 percent behind the Army's stated goal.¹⁹⁰

Lengthy deployments break precedent.

As of February 2004, the number of Guard and Reserve members away from home for more than 220 days in the past year reached 57,000 – compared to 1,600 in 2001.¹⁹¹ The Department of Defense expects that mobilizations of up to one year will be the norm for reservists over the next three to five years.¹⁹² In most cases these troops are deployed for 15 to 18 months, although active duty soldiers' foreign deployments are typically only one year.¹⁹³

Homeland security suffering.

Extended deployments overseas have diminished the ability of Guard units – who are first responders to attacks and emergencies at home – to prepare to secure and defend the nation's communities.¹⁹⁴ Returning Guard units face lengthy periods recapitalizing and reequipping, and are dangerously unprepared to handle traditional disaster relief missions at home.¹⁹⁵ The funding and priorities of reequipping Guard units are uncertain.

Civilian employers mistreat returning Guard and Reserve troops.

Approximately 4,000 guardsmen and reservists have filed job complaints with the Labor Department since 9/11 to complain about illegal treatment by their employers. This has occurred despite a federal law requiring employers to immediately give returning men and women of the National Guard and Reserves their civilian jobs back, along with any pay raises, promotions, pension contributions and other benefits missed while on duty.¹⁹⁶

National guardsmen lack health insurance.

A recent General Accountability Office report found that 20 percent of National guardsmen have no health insurance. This is a critical readiness issue, but the White House fought hard to prevent guardsmen and reservists from having access to TRICARE, the Pentagon's health insurance program.¹⁹⁷

Guard training budgets face shortfall.

The Guard’s requested training budget for next year faces a \$280 million shortfall, which would halt all training drills for soldiers next spring. Four soldiers testified before Congress that reservists are not getting the urban combat training they need before being sent to fight in Iraq.¹⁹⁸

Payment problems rife.

An astounding 95 percent of Army reservists called to active duty in Afghanistan and Iraq report problems with receiving military pay, including underpayments, overpayments, late payments, and a month’s delay or more in receiving tax exemption benefits.¹⁹⁹ Army Reserve payroll procedures are so “error-prone, cumbersome and complex” that soldiers could not be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payments.²⁰⁰

Military Support

Goal and Assessment

Support the troops and military families at home.

As U.S. troops operate under more deadly and uncertain conditions abroad, the Bush administration has failed to treat them well at home. The White House has supported cuts in pay, health insurance, disability care, and education for soldiers and their families. Without the necessary support, experienced and well-trained armed services personnel will opt for different careers.

Findings

Proposed cuts to danger pay and family separation allowances.

The Bush administration proposed cutting by one-third imminent danger pay for 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and 18,000 in Afghanistan.²⁰¹ It also proposed cutting by nearly two-thirds family separation allowances.²⁰² Public pressure forced Congress to reject the White House proposals.

Disabled soldiers turned away.

Thousands of U.S. soldiers have been injured abroad, yet less than one in ten are receiving the long-term disability payments they request. Nearly one-third of injured National Guard

and Reserve veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are forced to wait more than four months to learn if they will be compensated. The majority of those who receive disability pay leave the military with a one-time, lump-sum payment that some call inadequate.²⁰³

Inadequate medical treatment.

Soldiers leaving active duty have received little or no medical treatment, having to pay thousands of dollars from their own pockets. Veterans who responded to a survey by the American Legion in 2003 said it took an average of seven months to get a first appointment at the VA hospital. Misdiagnoses, disastrous management, and insufficient care were reported at 162 veterans' hospitals nationwide.²⁰⁴

Mental health needs unmet.

A study published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* found that 17.1 percent of those soldiers surveyed who had served in Iraq and 11.2 percent who had served in Afghanistan screened positive for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, major depression or anxiety. The study noted that a maximum of 40 percent of those identified as having serious mental illness are being treated.²⁰⁵

Education cuts.

The Bush administration requested a 14 percent cut in assistance to public schools on military bases and other federal property.²⁰⁶ The civilian leadership at the Pentagon is considering closing or transferring control of the 58 schools it operates on 14 military installations.²⁰⁷ These decisions threaten not only the quality of education for the children of soldiers, but also the morale and support of military families.

Assignment for Action: Priorities for Fighting the War on Terrorism

Terrorist Threat

- **Restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and rebalance Middle East policies.** The United States must immediately reengage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – widely seen as the greatest source of anti-Americanism, terrorism and tension in the Muslim world. The United States must return to its traditional and indispensable role of even-handed broker in the peace process.
- **Roll back the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan.** The President should lead efforts to create a NATO-run drug interdiction force in Afghanistan. This force would crack down on drug-trafficking and deter poppy production that fuels terrorist activities and inhibits political and economic development. We should fund programs to buyout poppy farmers and reorient agricultural production to non-illicit crops.
- **Lead a multinational effort to track terrorists and interdict their sources of financing.** The United States should provide the financial and technical support necessary to enforce United Nations resolutions regarding the tracking of suspected terrorists through an integrated international travel-ban list; establishment of standards and policies to combat terrorist financing; criminalization of terrorist activity; and aggressive prosecution of terrorist financiers. The OECD's Financial Action Task Force "Watch List" should be expanded to include countries that fail to comply with anti-terrorist financing standards.
- **Fund a ten-year, \$25 billion program to help Muslim countries found and develop secular schools.** Overcoming Islamic extremism requires an international effort to fund balanced, secular public education systems in the Middle East that provide new opportunities for young Muslim men and women. We must provide an alternative to

thousands of extreme anti-American madrassas, which promote extreme anti-American attitude, particularly in countries critical to reducing the global threat of terrorism.

- **Restore U.S. public diplomacy programs.** The President should immediately implement and fund the recommendations developed through the State Department's Djerejian Commission and dramatically increase funding for public diplomacy and level of skilled personnel. The United States must reengage the world through cultural and educational exchange programs, particularly with Muslim students wishing to better understand and tolerate Western political, economic and cultural traditions.
- **Prevent weak and failing states from becoming terrorist havens.** The President should issue an executive order to designate and set policy standards for countries that have the potential to become terrorist safe havens. Strategies and policy options should be developed to reform and strengthen such nations through diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, military intervention.

Homeland Security

- **Introduce a national security budget and integrate homeland security into the national security apparatus.** The President should order the Office of Management and Budget to draw up a national security budget that includes appropriations for defense, intelligence, homeland security, diplomacy and foreign assistance. In keeping with this approach, he should abolish the Homeland Security Council and integrate policy development and planning into the National Security Council.
- **Give new funding and priority to port security.** The President should ask Congress for the \$6.8 billion necessary to ensure full implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act within five years. The pace of Coast Guard modernization plans should be accelerated in light of its expanded missions and importance. The Container Security Initiative should be expanded to include additional ports in the Middle East and Africa, and proper incentives for rapid introduction of smart containers into global transportation networks should be provided to make international trade more transparent, efficient and secure.
- **Require the U.S. chemical industry to strengthen security and employ safer business practices.** The President should end reliance on voluntary programs and require manufacturers and handlers of potentially harmful chemicals to adhere to legally enforceable security standards. New legislation should be adopted based on the Responsible Care Security Code of Management Practices proposed by the American Chemistry Council. The aim should be to reduce chemical stockpiles, substitute safer

chemical alternatives whenever possible, and redirect chemical rail freight away from major metropolitan areas.

- **Eliminate the current color-coded threat alert system.** The President should order the Homeland Security Department to develop a new alert system that communicates more complete threat information, including better intelligence, to state, local and private sector partners. Threat warnings should be tailored by region and sector when possible and should be issued only when the American people are expected to take specific actions or confront more intrusive security measures. DHS should work with Congress to increase funding to cities and states to defray overtime costs associated with critical infrastructure protection during heightened threat periods.

Nonproliferation

- **Appoint a special envoy to negotiate a permanent end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.** The envoy, reporting to the President and Secretary of State, would engage in direct dialogue with North Korean officials within the Six Party framework to secure an agreement with a verifiable and intrusive inspection regime. An agreement and strict adherence to its terms would bring North Korea diplomatic relations with the United States, international security guarantees, and international economic and humanitarian assistance.
- **Accelerate programs to secure nuclear materials.** The President should give top funding and policy priority to cooperative threat reduction programs in and beyond the former Soviet Union. Funding for Nunn-Lugar should be tripled and the timetable for securing Russia's nuclear stockpile should be reduced to four years from the current 13. The U.S. should also help resolve liability and bureaucratic barriers inhibiting the reduction of Russia's nuclear weapons programs, sign the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty, and expand support for G8 nonproliferation efforts.
- **End development of new, more "usable" nuclear weapons and suspend deployment of National Missile Defense.** The President should immediately cancel development of the "bunker buster" and "mini nukes" and suspend further deployment of national missile defense systems. These moves could be used to launch a new multilateral appeal to encourage nations to join in international nuclear nonproliferation regimes.

Military Power

- **Increase the size of the Army and expand capabilities.** The Pentagon should add 40,000 active-duty troops to the Army, including a doubling of special operations capability. Army training programs should be adapted to provide all soldiers with post-conflict stabilization training based on experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Accelerated equipment production should be maintained so all Army units in deployment rotations for Iraq and Afghanistan have the latest upgraded body armor and vehicle armor prior to deploying overseas.
- **Increase health and job protection for Reserve and National Guard.** Recognizing the growing importance of National Guard and Reserve personnel and the need to improve military readiness, the President should give members of the Reserve component the opportunity to buy into the military's health care system. Members of the National Guard and Reserve should be paid accurately and promptly, and the Justice and Labor departments should develop a joint Task Force of investigators and prosecutors to investigate allegations of job discrimination when soldiers are illegally terminated, demoted or denied benefits after returning to civilian jobs.
- **Recommit America to compliance with the Geneva Conventions.** The President should travel to Geneva and publicly recommit the United States to the Geneva Conventions, pledging to end all practices that violate or undermine their letter or spirit. The President should immediately appoint an independent committee of former military and civilian judges to determine the accountability of senior leaders whose policy decisions undercut the Geneva Conventions and set the conditions for abuse to occur.

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END OF TERM REPORT

Student: **Bush Administration**

Subject: **National Security**

Term: **9/11/2001 - 9/11/2004**

Class	Grade	Comments
Terrorist Threat	C-	Needs strategy, focus on Afghanistan
Homeland Security	D+	Good intentions, weak follow-through
Nonproliferation	F	Increased threat, paid no attention
Military Power	D	Stretched too thin, need to honor troops

Extracurricular Activities: Iraq has been a catastrophic diversion from primary curriculum.

Approved *the Center for American Progress*

See "Failing Grades: America's Security Three Years After 9/11" at americanprogress.org

